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Résumé: On propose de caractériser un système de pilotage et de contrôle à partir de trois 
dimensions: l'implication des managers, la spécificité des outils, la relation avec le 
système d'incitation. Cette caractérisation constitue une extension directe de la 
typologie introduite par Simons (1995) pour distinguer entre contrôle interactif et 
contrôle diagnostic. Les tentatives récurrentes pour rénover le contrôle de gestion 
suite aux critiques sévères formulées par Kaplan et Johnson (1987) sont alors re-
examinées. Les approches du type contrôle stratégique ou le management par la 
valeur apparaissent respectivement comme représentatives soit du contrôle interactif 
soit du contrôle diagnostic. Le cadre proposé permet de bien rendre compte des forces 
et faiblesses de ce type d'approches toujours très en vogue auprès des entreprises. 
 
Abstract:  Three dimensions characterize a management control system: the nature of the 
involvement of operational managers, the degree of customization of the underlying 
tools and the relationship with the compensation policy.  This characterization 
further formalizes the distinction between diagnostic and interactive control systems 
introduced by Simons (1995). It provides an interesting framework to discuss the 
recurrent attempts to renovate management control that followed the severe criticism 
of Johnson and Kaplan (1987). In this framework, information systems based on a 
strategic vision of the activity are representative of interactive control while value 
based management systems such as EVA are representative of diagnostic control. The 
strengths and weaknesses of each approach are discussed using the proposed 
taxonomy as a theoretical grid.      
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Research conducted by Simons (1995) on the use of management control systems in 
situations of strategic change, prompted him to define a new approach to these systems, which 
is based on the distinction between interactive control systems and diagnostic control systems. 
This approach has spawned an increasingly rich body of literature, which reflects an interest 
in the analysis, and design of management control systems (Bisbe & Otley, 2004, Bruining et 
al., 2004, Davila, 2000, Marginson, 2002, Sponem, 2004). This approach raises the issue of 
what is traditionally referred to as management control in its accounting form. 
 
Even though Simons’ new approach was admittedly innovative and different, it 
remained cut off from the major debates raging in the field of management control (e.g. the 
development of activity-based accounting, strategic scorecards [“tableaux de bord”], and 
value based management).  
 
Broadly speaking, it may be said that these debates were triggered by a major 
publication by Johnson and Kaplan (1987). In this well-known work, the authors presented a 
well-documented indictment of management control as it was practiced at that time in many 
Anglo-Saxon firms. They underlined the gap that existed between these systems and the 
operational management of the firm. Control systems were essentially based on an accounting 
vision of reality and broke down in very great detail the various functions and departments of 
the firm, thereby encouraging an incremental and local approach to the drafting of budgets. 
Operational staff that used these systems was sometimes constrained to make absolutely 
foolish decisions. The real objective of the company, according to the authors, required a 
radically different approach based on a high degree of responsiveness from the entire firm, as 
well as greater coordination between functions and departments. This had become necessary 
as firms increasingly faced a highly uncertain technical and/or commercial environment. 
 
This assessment was widely accepted by management personnel in the corporate world, 
and resulted in a major burst of contributions, especially from consultants. Otley (2001) has 
classified these contributions into two main categories: 
¾ Firstly, a school of thought built around an increasingly strategic vision of 
information systems. A significant body of research based on case analysis or 
experimentation existed in French companies at that time. It focused on the 
management of projects (Midler, 1990), activity based costing as a step for activity 
based management (Lorino 1991, Lebas, 1991, Mévellec, 1990), production 
management (Hatchuel and Sardas, 1990), as well as on the design of interactive 
budgets (Tanguy 1992). Similar trends of research occurred in Anglo-saxon firms. In 
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the United States, this work received its initial impetus from Kaplan and was later 
developed in several directions such as to the present day Balanced Scorecard, or 
BSC, designed by the consultant David Norton (Kaplan et Norton, 1996).  
¾ Secondly, another movement built around value based management. It was initiated 
later and focused on acquiring a greater understanding of incentives in control 
systems. This work was especially prompted by Stern, encouraged by leading 
researchers such as Jensen (2001), and operationnally developed by many 
management consulting firms, Stern&Stewart being of the better known for its EVA 
systems (Stewart, 1991, Stern, Stewart and Chew, 1996).  
 
The objective of this article is to make more explicit the connection between the 
theoretical framework developed by Simons and those more applied but important 
contributions. 
 
To better establish this connection it is proposed to extend Simons’ taxonomy to 
explicitely include the two dimensions that played a key role in those applied contributions 
namely: the nature of the control tools and the relationship of the control system with the 
compensation policy.  
 
Interactive systems would then be characterized not only by the continuous involvement 
of operational staff, but also by the use of more customized tools making explicit the 
interaction between the various departments while entertaining a loose connection with the 
compensation policy. Diagnostic systems would feature not only arms’ length relationship 
along the hierarchical line, but also the reliance on more generic control tools that are 
explicitly linked to performance indicators used in the compensation policy. In interactive 
control emphasis would be on improved internal coordination through relevant decision 
support systems while in diagnostic control emphasis would be on alignment with 
shareholders through more relevant internal financial indicators. 
 
It will be argumented that this enlarged theoretical framework facilitates the discussion 
of the strengths and weaknesses of recurrent attempts to renovate management control.  
 
In section 1 a brief reminder of Simons’ theoretical framework is provided. Section 2 
extends Simons’ approach by introducing two new dimensions: the degree of customization 
of the control tools, the degree of objectivity of the relationship with the compensation policy. 
In section 3 the attempts to redefine management control systems are re-examined from a 
theoretical point. This theoretical re-assessment is then used to suggest future avenues of 
research. 
 
2. AN EXTENSION OF SIMONS’ TAXONOMY OF CONTROL SYSTEMS 
Simons (1995) defines “modern” management control systems as “the formal, 
information-based routines and procedures managers use to maintain or alter patterns in 
organizational activities”. This paper will hereafter refers to this concept as “control system”. 
These ideas first appear in Simons (1991) and were further developed in Simons (1999). 
 
2.1 SIMONS’S TAXONOMY 
The major contribution made by Simons was to put forward taxonomy of control 
systems in which the following types of control were distinguished: 
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Diagnostic control (Simons, 1995, 59). This type of control is performed by using a wide 
range of indicators, which reflect the different facets of a company’s performance, or 
more generally the information which managers require in order accomplishing their 
management tasks. The purpose of diagnostic control is to provide a relatively 
exhaustive measurement of performance. This aspect of control must often be 
computerized so as to save the manager’s time since the quantity of information to be 
processed is extremely high.  
Interactive control (Simons, 1995, 95).  This type of control implies a very high degree of 
interaction by managers with their subordinates in order to deal with the firm’s strategic 
priorities, and requires strong personal involvement in their subordinates’ decision 
making. In a situation of interactive control, the manager’s attention is focused on one of 
the control tools. The data generated by the control tool creates a nearly obsessional 
determination with the manager and leads them to call into question various aspects of 
the company that they are managing. The quantity of data in question should not be too 
high so as to enable each manager to absorb this information, in addition to executing 
the many tasks required by his position. 
 
Control tools as such are neutral. Some control tools are used by managers to personally 
involve themselves in the management of their activity, and to interact with their 
subordinates. Other more numerous control tools are used for diagnostic control at arm’s 
length and/or based on a management by exception principle. 
 
The interactive control method will focus on areas which will vary from company to 
company according to the critical performance criteria. 
 
In his research Simons drew up a list of factors to associate some control tools with the 
relevant type of uncertainty to be controlled. 
 
For example: 
When competition is technology-based, companies must be prepared to protect their 
technological skills (e.g. patent protection, upgrading of technical skills). When 
competition is based solely on the perceived satisfaction of the customer, companies 
should strive to develop their marketing skills. When a firm competes on regulated 
markets, it should ensure that it has a sufficient number of outside contacts in order 
to effectively manage networks of influence. 
When value chains are complex and require the involvement of several decision-makers, 
detailed industrial planning systems are considered to be the most appropriate. In the 
case of non-complex value chains, managers need only have recourse to input/output 
measurements. 
Competition based primarily on time and quick reactions requires that managers closely 
monitor sales trends, otherwise they will use general financial planning systems. 
 
Simons’ approach operates a clear distinction between (i) control tools, (ii) the role and 
function of controllers, and (iii) the management control process. Interactive and diagnostic 
systems have clear differences on the last two items but no difference at all on the first item.  
 
2.2 EXTENSION OF SIMONS’ THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Simons’ approach is extended in two directions.  
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Firstly, the fact that strategic vision be used to select the area for interactive control does 
have an impact on the tools as such. This is particularily the case because the emphasis is on 
prompting a better coordination within the firm. In this line of thought vertical (hierarchical) 
interactivity (the one emphasized by Simons) goes along with horizontal (cross functional) 
interactivity, and horizontal interactivity often requires the design of specific control tools, as 
will be apparent in the applied work. For example, consider a production entity and a 
commercial entity; it is possible to characterize what would be their relationships in a 
“diagnostic” and in an “interactive” control framework. In the first case, the relationship is 
based on generic performance indicators (quantities, costs and margins; standards for these 
indicators are defined in the budget and the variances between actual and standards are listed 
and analysed). In the second case, the relationship is based on a specific representation of the 
material flows of the firm’s activity (which may include suppliers and clients, capacity 
constraints...), thereby generating more customized performance indicators. 
 
Secondly, the relationship between the control system and the compensation policy is 
introduced. It is argued that it makes a difference whether the emphasis is on internal 
coordination or on a better alignment with financial objectives. In the first case, the 
relationship may be based on subjective assessments while in the second case it may rely on 
more quantified and objective indicators. This relationship interacts with the way the control 
system is used. As a matter of fact, contarily to the first dimension, Simons () does introduce 
this connection. In this respect, the proposed extension merely explicits his ideas. 
 
These two dimensions refer to a set of questions that can be summarized as follows: 
 
How are the control tools constructed? What is the degree of customization of the 
control tools? Are they rather: 
generic? Can they be easily transposed from one business activity to another? Can 
it be decomposed to independent subsets of control tools within the 
organization? 
customized? Are they based on a strategic vision specific to a particular activity? Is 
it important that the operational managers share this vision thus inducing 
horizontal interdependence?  
What is the relationship of the control system with the compensation policy? Is the 
reward system based on the indicators defined in the control system:  
objectively? Using a formal quantitative calibrated scheme? 
subjectively? Only loosely through qualitative and subjective judgments of the 
superior? 
 
Table1 provides a detailed set of questions to identify further the nature of a given 
control system.  Two distinctive sets of answers are given to define the two idealized 
diagnostic and interactive control systems that are proposed to extend Simons’taxonomy.  
 
(insert Table 1 about here) 
 
3. RE-EXAMINATION OF TWO ATTEMPTS TO REFORM MANAGEMENT 
CONTROL  
 
It will now be demonstrated that this extended framework allows for an original and 
productive re-examination of certain approaches, which at various times in the past, have 
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attempted to redefine management control in order to better meet the needs of strategic 
changes. In this respect, the extended framework provides a better understanding of the 
strengths and weaknesses of these various approaches. 
 
This re-examination is carried on using Otley (2001) classification of the past 
contributions into two main categories: 
• strategic vision of information systems; 
• value based management. 
 
Our theoretical framework clearly shows the differences between these two schools of 
thought, as well as their underlying intellectual grounding. Table 2 presents both the 
traditional control system criticized by Jonson and Kaplan (1987) and the two types of 
approaches attempting to revive it. For each one of the two main alternative approaches, the 
theoretical framework serves to identify the nature of the problem, and then to explain the two 
proposed solutions. Our framework may then be used to provide an analysis of both the 
strengths and weaknesses of these solutions. 
 
(insert Table 2 about here) 
 
3.1 Identification of the problem  
 
To a certain extent both approaches have succeeded in isolating the problem by 
identifying a discrepancy between the firm’s performance and the indicators used by the 
control system to measure this very performance. However, in the first case the discrepancy 
tends to be linked with the information system, whereas in the second case it tends to be 
related to the assessment system.  
 
In the first case, the main emphasis was placed on the pernicious effects of control 
system indicators. “The Goal: A Process of Ongoing Improvement” by Goldratt and Cox 
(1986) was without a doubt one of the most popular publications which exemplified this 
school of thought. It described in the form of a novel the failure of traditional local control 
tools to eliminate excessive hold-ups, delays, inventories and costs in the management of a 
production workshop. The authors underlined the merits of adopting an overall approach 
based on Japanese management techniques. The main focus of this book is to re-position the 
strategy at the heart of the firm’s management, and to re-build an appropriate control system 
based on its intended industrial and commercial strategy. 
 
In the second case, the starting point seems to be related to the excessive remuneration 
of top management in light of the poor share price performance of their firms. According to 
Jensen and Murphy (1990), remuneration depends more on factors such as a firm’s size rather 
than on its performance on the stock market. Many authors also recount a number of 
anecdotes about private jets and other unwarranted benefits received by top management. On 
paper it is true that these remunerations were often linked to accounting performance 
indicators, which were easily manipulated. This assessment of the situation therefore 
recommends the establishment of a better alignment between the objectives of a firm (value 
creation) and performance indicators intended to determine the remuneration of managers. 
 
3.2 Proposed Solutions  
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The first school of thought thus approaches the re-designing of management control by 
drawing up a new strategic vision. This process of re-evaluation results in the re-definition of 
the firm’s organization and control systems. In this respect, the automobile industry has been 
one of the foremost examples of this shift (Clark, Hayes et Wheelwright, 1988). Changes in 
this industry have included the shortening of the design phase, the implementation of 
platforms common to several models, and delayed differentiation techniques. In general, these 
changes have resulted in the establishment of a broad, cross-functional vision suited to the 
monitoring of projects and activities. As a result, attention shifted away from the 
representation of a firm based on the simple juxtaposition of profit centers. In terms of the 
control systems, the actual concept itself of budgetary control has been impacted by this 
change, and has resulted in the following: 
Performance indicators: the introduction of so-called material or operational indicators 
in systems essentially containing financial or accounting indicators (Chassang, 
1987). This is also one of the characteritics of the Balanced Scorecard (Kaplan & 
Norton, 1996, 2001a) 
Performance indicators: introduction of the concept of activity and the processes in the 
evalution of costs and performance like in ABC/ABM. 
Involvement of operational managers: the establishment of the idea that control systems 
should be considered more as tools to enhance communication rather than as 
instruments to control. As a result, management was placed in opposition to 
reporting, and an overhaul of the role (and profile) of controllers was proposed. 
 
A case study by Tanguy (1989) is particularly interesting in that a link is established 
between, both financial and non financial, performance indicators and the involvement of 
operational managers. This study shows how different operational departments were 
mobilized by the firm’s management with the support of management controllers to obtain: 
firstly consistent material flows, secondly financial outcomes generated by explicitly 
consistent material flows. This approach may be contrasted with a more traditional procedure 
usually adopted in that company based on the direct allocation of resources to these 
departments, the use of transfer prices to define profit centres, the setting of local objectives 
on the basis of past performance and, finally, a discussion of total budget by piling up and 
slicing, possibly inconsistent, decentralized budgets. In the case study, which concerned a 
sector of activity particularily vulnerable to Johnson and Kaplan criticism, this new approach 
provided opportunities for creating new leeway thanks to its collective nature4. 
 
In this situation the issue of the associated incentive scheme usually remains implicit. 
The underlying assumption seems that individuals derive their motivation from a feeling of 
mobilization with a team dedicated to accomplishing collective objectives. 
 
Regarding BSC, in coherence with his statement that it is possible to use all the tools 
both in a diagnostic manner and an interactive one, (Kaplan & Norton, 2001b, 154, Simons, 
1995; 68-69) does not classify it as interactive. However, several decription of BSC 
implementation and use are consistent with its classification as an interactive tool in our 
taxonomy. Firstly, in terms of its use as a basis for compensation, Kaplan and Norton were 
very cautious in their first book (1996). In their second book (2001b), they describe situations 
where BSC indicators are used as a basis for incentives but mainly via collective bonuses. 
                                                 
4 A quite successful teaching tool known as the “Champagne Game” was created at this time in order to illustrate 
this change in perspective (de Jaegere and Ponssard, 1990). For a detailed experimental study demonstrating the 
superiority of horizontal interactive control, see Ponssard and Saulpic (2005). 
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Moreover, case studies led in France show that the BSC is not deployed throughout the 
hierarchy, but remains at BU level. It is then used to define cross functional projects to 
improve the indicators defined in the BSC, those projects are monitored directly by the 
general management of the BU and no explicit bonus schemes are linked to the BSC5. It is 
thus consistent with our interactive classification and the fact that interactivity requires 
specificity. Finally, Kaplan and Norton (2001b) mention de deployment of BSC at individual 
level. But they do not explain how these individual BSC are used in the compensation policy 
if they are, and they underline that this use of BSC is different from traditional Management 
by Objective. 
 
Reviving budgetary control through the adoption of value-based management has 
underlined the particular importance of performance indicators. The initial objective was 
indeed to re-create “financial” indicators better in line with the maximization of value for the 
shareholders than the traditional accounting ones. Two main tools were employed to this end. 
The first tool, developed by the consulting firm Stern&Stewart, builds on a traditional 
indicator known as “residual income”. It then introduced a host of adjustments to operate the 
intended alignment. In all Stern&Stewart performed some one hundred adjustments (e.g. by 
capitalizing R&D expenses or the initial years of operation of a strategic investment), which 
led to the creation of a new indicator known as EVA. The second tool is primarily focused on 
defining average cash flows over a specified period of time for budgeted investments, and is 
known under the name of CFROI. Better business plans (with profitability stages related to 
clearly defined project portfolios) may be built by using this tool. This tool was developed by 
the Boston Consulting Group. The specialized business press widely publicized the 
commercial rivalry between these tools (Myers, 1996). In retrospect, it is clear that the EVA 
approach went the furthest in reforming control systems because it explicitly took into 
consideration the assessment system, and as such led to a number of proposals intended to 
completely review management incentive systems (O’Hanlon and Peasnell, 1998). It should 
be emphasized that this approach is fairly radical as it proposes to set standards no longer on 
the basis of budgets or achievements in the past year, but in accordance with the expectations 
of the financial markets. An entire toolbox was thus created in order to calibrate the presumed 
link between the market value of the firm and its expected EVA taking into account business 
cycles (O’Byrne, 1997). As a result, the link between the budget and the establishment of 
bonuses was completely severed. Jensen (2001) views this break as a very positive point as it 
enables the budget to re-capture its initial role, i.e. business plan coordination and forecast of 
financial results.  
 
The aim of this approach is to replicate market incentive mechanisms within 
organizations. It is based on generic performance indicators, which enables management at 
arm’s length. 
 
3.3 Limitations of each approach 
 
The rationale behind each one of the two proposed solutions to reform management 
control has now been clearly established and the distinction between the two alternatives 
made very clear. This facilitates the discussion of their respective limitations. 
 
                                                 
5 See for instance the case « Compu-Mark » in Mendoza and al. (2005) 
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Consider the first proposed solution. Any attempt to strategically change management 
control assumes in fact that once the new strategy has been explained and the new 
performance indicators defined, the firm’s workforce will in principle find itself naturally 
motivated to seek out all suitable actions to carry out this aim. As a result, ABM (Lorino 
1991) or the BSC, which represents the most recent version of this strategic shift, does not 
address the issue of incentives in sufficient details. The compensation schemes based on 
collective performance remain unprecise. For example, it does not deal with the difficulty in 
building an incentive system based on a dashboard, which includes a series of indicators. How 
each indicator should be calibrated and weighted remains an unaddressed point. Moreover, 
little attention is paid to the difficulty in implementing team incentives with company 
personnel while avoiding the phenomenon of free riding.  
 
More generally, such appraoches do not address the possible need to re-assess the 
human resources management policy of the company in accordance with the new 
recommended coordination methods. Mottis (1999), through a case study about the 
management of computer projects in banks, shows the importance of this point to explain the 
relative failure associated with project management. At that time personnel in French banks, 
as opposed to other sectors such as the car industry, were traditionally managed through tight 
professional classifications. 
 
Consider now the proposed solution which relies on value based management. It 
assumes that strategic change will automatically occur and go in the right direction because of 
the better alignment of incentives. A number of research studies while reporting the intrinsic 
(while already known long ago) value of EVA as a financial indicator cast some doubts on the 
validity of this assertion.  Firstly, while Stern holds that the EVA system is simpler and more 
objective than the traditional systems (EVA roundtable, 1994), in a detailed case study, 
Riceman et al. (2002) highlighted the fact that a significant number of managers did not 
understand the EVA system. This difficulty in comprehending the system is also mentioned 
by Wallace (1997) and Mottis and Ponssard (2001-2002). Secondly, Larmande and Ponssard 
(2005) point out another difficulty with the EVA system, namely the fact that this indicator’s 
degree of controllability is quite low (Antle and Demski, 1988). The authors show in a case 
study that a great number of managers consider that their bonuses are more directly related to 
business conditions, rather than to the result of their efforts. Ittner and Larker (1998) studied 
the changes made to EVA at AT&T. The initial system also seems to have suffered from a 
lack of controllability as it was modified in order to include a series of items, which were 
more controllable, such as customer and employee satisfaction. However, AT&T went 
through a period of value destruction (i.e. a decrease in the share price) as a result of 
unprofitable strategic investments. In the end this system was simply dropped, as internal 
bonuses remained high due to the adjustment mechanism, despite the financial difficulties 
encountered by the firm. When suitable, the implementation of an EVA approach may then be 
useful in so far as it provides a company-wide tool to easily take into account the cost of 
capital, rather than using it for the sake of the framework itself. 
 
4. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE AVENUES OF RESEARCH 
Our theoretical framework characterizes a management control system based on three 
dimensions: the nature of the involvement of operational managers, the degree of 
customization of the control tools and the degree of objectivity of the relationship with the 
compensation policy. Two theoretical management control systems are identified, building on 
Simons’ classification, i.e. diagnostic and interactive systems. It is suggested that diagnostic 
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systems are based on arms’ length relationships, generic control tools and objective 
assessment procedures while interactive systems imply continuous managerial involvement, 
customized control tools and subjective assessment schemes.  
 
Using this taxonomy, proposed solutions to revive traditional control systems may be 
examined. For instance, the operational approaches such as information systems based on 
strategic vision appear in line with interactive systems while value based management 
approaches such as EVA appear in line with diagnostic systems.  
 
This analysis provides a tool to better understand the mechanism of action and the 
limitations of these two approaches because of the difficulty in designing a system consistent 
all along the three dimensions of our grid. It shows that each one is based on an underlying 
assumption that is highly debatable: on the one hand the operational approach assumes that 
once the strategy has been explained, managers will be naturally inclined to implement it; on 
the other hand the value based management approach assumes that if incentives are correctly 
aligned, managers will naturally find the right strategy. The limits of these assertions clearly 
correspond to difficulties encountered in practice. 
 
The fact that there seem to be empirical limitations associated to each management 
control system raises the issue of another contribution made by Simons (1994), i.e. the 
diachronic complementarity observed between diagnostic and interactive systems. The 
discussion carried out in this paper suggests that this complementarity may in fact be 
necessary due to the intrinsic limits of each system taken in isolation. A diagnostic system 
could potentially be lacking in strategy, whereas an interactive system could potentially have 
a lack of incentives. If this were indeed the case, the limits inherent to each system could be 
mitigated by a joint diachronic approach, rarely proposed by consulting firms for obvious 
reasons. Future research work should focus on studying this conjecture, and should include 
the following areas: 
Pursue the theoretical characterization of interactive and diagnostic systems,  
In particular, study the reciprocal impact of the different system dimensions on each 
other, i.e. the impact of incentive schemes on the performance indicators and vice 
versa, or the impact of the nature of the involvement of managers on the degree of 
the subjectivity of standards, 
Analyze the interactions and complementarities between the diagnostic and interactive 
systems in field studies to evaluate their possible complementarities empirically. 
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Table 1 – Additional Features for Interactive and Diagnostic Control Systems 
  
The 
Control Systems  
 
How are the control tools 
constructed? 
 
How do the managers 
use the system? 
 
 
What is the relationship 
with the compensation 
policy? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Possible set 
of questions to be 
addressed 
What is the nature of the 
indicators that are measured 
(financial, non financial, daily, 
monthly, yearly…)?  
How have they been identified 
(generic business approach or 
specific business vision)? 
Do they easily decompose into 
subsets of indicators or are they 
closely interdependent? 
Are they based on a standard 
information system or do they 
require customized processes? 
Is the system audited? 
 
In the organization, who 
is in charge of the control 
process, of the information 
gathering, ofvalidating the 
data, ofupgrading the 
system  (control 
department, marketing, 
production…)? 
Is the control system part 
of the formal budgeting 
process or used in other 
instances?  
How frequently is it 
used? With what 
implications for 
operational managers? 
To what extent are some 
indicators used as 
objectives for the 
compensation policy?  
Is the alignement of 
objectives rather internal 
to reinforce internal 
coordination or rather 
external to make managers 
feel like owners?  
How are standards set 
(internally through 
subjective assessment or 
through outside 
benchmarks)?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Diagnostic 
Indicators are issued yearly from 
P&L, and updated monthly (e.g. 
ROI) possibly enriched through 
simple aggregate data (quantities 
sold, price indices…).  
Based on a rather generic business 
approach to create value. 
Intended to be broken down into 
profit centers and along the 
organizational chart with little 
consideration to their possible 
interdependence. 
These indicators are obtained 
from the standard information 
system.  
The indicators are audited. 
The monitoring of the 
system is given to 
controllers.  
Used as an integral part 
of the budgeting process. 
Limited use as a 
simulation tool.  
Controllers using partial 
data from operational 
managers make monthly 
updates. 
Management by 
exception. 
Some indicators are 
typically used in the 
compensation policy. 
Emphasis is on 
alignment with 
shareholders with little 
consideration towards 
internal coordination. 
Calibration is explicit 
using quantitative formula 
with targets and stretch 
goals.  
The calibration may be 
either internal or external, 
but reference to an 
external judgment is 
always present. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interactive 
Indicators are based on a specific 
analysis of the performance 
factors of the business.  
A model is designed to structure 
the interdependency of the KPI 
through the decisions made in the 
different departments, the time 
structure is chosen to be relevant 
to the issues (unfolding of 
uncertainties, long term impact of 
decisions…). 
Data gathering relies on specific 
as well as on standard data 
collection procedures. 
The indicators are not intended 
to be audited. 
The design and the 
monitoring of the system 
require a high degree of 
involvement by 
operational managers.   
Frequent usage (both ex 
ante and ex post) and 
feedbacks directly 
performed by operational 
managers.  
Controllers would be 
incapable of producing 
meaningful forecasts 
without the involvement 
of operational managers. 
No formal link with the 
compensation policy. 
Emphasis is on 
promoting internal 
coordination.  
Indirect incentives are 
based on managerial 
discretion of superior 
(with qualitative 
judgments assessing the 
degree of involvement of 
individuals and/or teams 
in the actual decision 
processes). 
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Table 2 – Historical Background of Control Systems 
 
 
Applications to the 
analysis 
of empirical systems 
 
    How are the control 
tools constructed? 
 
How do the managers 
use the system? 
 
 
What is the relationship 
with the compensation 
policy? 
 
 
 
Budgetary Control 
(1950-1970) 
Accounting indicators 
with limited information 
on physical flows.  
Decomposed through the 
organization using 
transfer prices and 
allocation of common 
costs to the units. 
Ex ante analysis of budgets 
Monthly follow-up by 
controller with a variance 
analysis 
 
Incremental approach 
based on past year’s 
results and budgetary 
forecasts 
 
Problem of rear view mirror management 
Strategic revival 
of “interactive” 
management 
control (e.g. 
ABC/activity-
based 
management) 
 
 
 
Solution 
More efficient link 
between accounting and 
operational systems 
Emphasize global 
achievement rather than 
local objectives 
Control systems used as tool 
for dialogue 
Controller’s role reformed 
Used more for management 
than reporting  
 
No explicit assessment.  
Workforce encouraged 
to work towards 
collective objectives 
 
Problem of gap between bonuses paid and financial results of the firm 
Revival of 
“diagnostic” 
incentive 
systems (e.g. 
value based 
management, 
EVA) 
 
 
Solution 
More efficient link 
between accounting 
systems and external 
indicators related to value 
creation 
 Control system used as 
main pillar of arm’s length 
management 
Total overhaul of 
incentive system based 
on external standards 
 
 
